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PAYING NCAA ATHLETES 




The NCAA has recently faced unprecedented legal challenges that could 
fundamentally alter the labor market it faces.  The most prominent of these is 
the case brought by Ed O'Bannon.1  United States District Court Judge Claudia 
Wilken ruled in 2014 that NCAA amateurism rules violate federal antitrust laws 
and players were entitled to $5,000 per year for name, image, and  
likeness rights.2  In 2015, the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of  
Appeals reduced the $5,000 payment to a simple cost of attendance payment3  
(which many schools already provide).4  
Another case, Jenkins v. NCAA,5 directly attacks the NCAA rules limiting 
the pay of athletes to the cost of attendance.  This case—argued by Jeffrey  
Kessler—asserts that the NCAA violates antitrust laws when it limits how 
schools compensate their student-athletes.6 
And then there was the proposed union for football players at Northwestern 
University.  In February 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held 
a hearing to decide if football players were employees and, therefore, had the 
right to unionize.7  The NCAA contended football players were  
                                                 
* David J. Berri earned his Ph.D. from Colorado State University. He is an applied microeconomist 
with teaching and research interests in the economics of sport, with a focus on player performance, 
competitive balance, college sports, and gender economics. 
1. See generally O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, 802 F.3d 
1049 (9th Cir. 2015). O'Bannon starred at UCLA from 1991 to 1995.  Years later he discovered his 
likeness being used in a video game by EA Sports. O'Bannon sued both EA Sports and the NCAA for 
using his likeness without his permission and without compensation.  
2. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007–08. 
3. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076–79.  The Ninth Circuit, though, did affirm that the NCAA rules  
violated federal antitrust laws.  Michael McCann, What the Appeals Court Ruling Means for  
O’Bannon’s Ongoing NCAA Lawsuit, SI, http://www.si.com/college-basketball/2015/09/30/ed-oban-
non-ncaa-lawsuit-appeals-court-ruling (last updated Oct. 2, 2015). 
4. McCann, supra note 3. 
5. See generally Jenkins v. NCAA, 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015). 
6. Liz Mullen, Kessler: Ruling in O’Bannon Will Aid in NCAA Antitrust Case, SPORTS BUS. J., Oct. 
12, 2015, at 15. 
7. The Author served as an expert witness for the union at the original NLRB hearing on this issue. 
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“student-athletes”; the term was actually invented by the NCAA in the 1950s in 
response to a claim by a former NCAA football player who demanded workers’ 
compensation.8  Walter Byers (the executive director of the NCAA from 1951 
to 1987) noted in his 1995 autobiography, “We crafted the term student-athlete, 
and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations as a mandated 
substitute for such words as players and athletes. We told college publicists to 
speak of ‘college teams,’ not football or basketball ‘clubs,’ a word common to 
the pros.”9   
The initial NLRB ruling rejected the NCAA’s contention and supported the 
argument that college athletes are employees who have the right to unionize.  In 
2015, though, the NLRB refused to rule on the appeal in the case.  By refusing 
to rule, the players were effectively denied the right to unionize.10 
At the moment, the NCAA does not appear to be losing these cases.  
Therefore, something akin to the status quo is being maintained.  But it seems 
unlikely that these legal challenges will cease. And if one is successful, the labor 
market in college sports could fundamentally change. 
The purpose of this Article is to answer three questions related to how 
changes in the labor market could impact the future of college sports: 
 
1. Why did schools decide to dramatically limit the pay of  
student-athletes? This first question must be answered to  
understand the current market. 
2. How does this practice impact the level of competitive  
balance in college sports? This second question directly  
addresses the NCAA’s assertion that labor market restrictions 
are necessary to maintain competitive balance.  
3. How much would student-athletes be paid if schools did not 
limit their compensation?  This last question examines what a 
free market for labor would look like for the “student-athletes” 
(i.e., employees) the NCAA employs.  
 
The answers to these three questions will reveal that much of what the NCAA 
                                                 
8. Opinion, The O’Bannon Ruling: ‘Student-Athlete’ Is History, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/opinion/the-obannon-ruling-student-athlete-is-history.html. 
9. WALTER BYERS & CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE 
ATHLETES 69 (4th ed. 1998) (emphasis omitted); accord The O’Bannon Ruling: ‘Student-Athlete’ Is 
History, supra note 8. 
10. Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-says-northwestern-football-play-
ers-cannot-unionize.html. 
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claims regarding athlete compensation runs counter to the empirical evidence.  
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMERCIALIZATION IN COLLEGE SPORTS 
There is a tendency to think the commercialization of college sports is 
something that has only recently happened.  In fact, though, college sports have 
been commercialized for more than a century.  For example, in 1890, Woodrow 
Wilson, then-president of Princeton University (and future president of the 
United States), told the alumni of his school, “Princeton is noted in this wide 
world for three things: football, baseball, and collegiate [instruction].”11 
Football was certainly big business for Princeton.  In the late 1880s, the 
Princeton–Yale game attracted 40,000 paying spectators.12 The 1893  
Thanksgiving game between these two schools generated $13,000 in revenue 
for each school,13 or $313,297 in 2014 dollars.14 
The revenue generated by sporting events leads to what should be an  
obvious question:  How much revenue should be paid to the athletes who the 
fans are paying to see? 
In every other business in American society, workers must be paid at least 
a minimum wage from the revenue generated by the firm.  Colleges and  
universities, though, have gotten around this practice by relabeling the workers’ 
titles.  Rather than call the athletes competing on the field “workers,” colleges 
and universities utilize the term “student-athlete.”  In addition, schools also  
argue that student-athletes are “amateurs”15 and, therefore, are not entitled to be 
paid.   
Meanwhile, the revenues generated by college sports keep increasing.  In 
2014, NCAA revenues were nearly $1 billion.16  Much of this revenue is  
                                                 
11. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME 
COLLEGE SPORTS 7 (1999) (quoting ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 45 (1992)). 
12. Id. 
13. Kavitha A. Davidson, The Ivy League Origins of Thanksgiving Football, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-26/the-ivy-league-origins-of-
thanksgiving-football. 
14. The real value of dollars in 1893 was determined via the GDP deflator.  See generally Samuel 
H. Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount - 1774 to Present, 
MEASURING WORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/m/calculators/uscompare/result.php?year_ 
source=1893&amount=13,000&year_result=2014 (last visited June 9, 2016). 
15. The word “amateur” tends to have a very circular definition when applied by the NCAA.   As 
Patrick Hruby has noted, “[C]ollege sports are amateur because otherwise they wouldn't be college 
sports, which are amateur.” Patrick Hruby, Court of Illusion, SPORTSONEARTH (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/62747894/.  
16. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/03/11/ncaa-financial-statement-2014-1bil-
lion-revenue/70161386/. 
BERRI FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:30 PM 
482 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:2 
generated from the sale of media rights.17  These media rights exist because fans 
enjoy watching college athletes compete. Because of NCAA rules, though,  
compensation of the athletes who generate the revenue is significantly  
restricted.  
III. THE COMPETITIVE BALANCE STORY 
The limit on player pay in college sports is officially related to the drive to 
promote competitive balance or relative equality in the strength of the  
competitors in each competition.  As Jim Peach notes,  
 
Promoting competitive balance is a major concern of the 
NCAA. Three of the NCAA’s core principles directly address 
competitive balance. These are core principles 2.10 The  
Principle of Competitive Equity, 2.11 The Principle  
Governing Recruiting, and 2.12 The Principle Governing  
Eligibility. These principles state, in part: 
 Core Principle 2.10: The structure and programs of 
the Association and the activities of its members 
shall promote opportunity for equity in  
competition to assure that individual student  
athletes and institutions will not be prevented  
unfairly from achieving the benefits inherent in 
participation in intercollegiate athletics. 
 Core Principle 2.11: The Principle Governing  
Recruiting. Regulations shall be designed to  
promote equity among member institutions . . . . 
 Core Principle 2.12: The Principle Governing  
Eligibility. Eligibility requirements shall be  
designed to assure proper emphasis on  
educational objectives, to promote competitive  
equity among institutions, and to prevent  
exploitation of student athletes. 
. . . In a meaningful sense, the principles governing  
recruiting and eligibility were adopted by the NCAA in order 
to promote competitive balance. Indeed, the principle of  
amateurism and various regulations concerning financial aid 
                                                 
17. Id. 
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are also intended to promote competitive balance.18 
 
Despite this objective, though, Peach notes that competitive balance does 
not characterize college sports.19  This point is established by looking at who 
generally wins in various sports.  For example, Peach notes,  
 
 From 1950 to 2006, 50.4% of all final four  
appearances in NCAA men’s basketball were made by 
thirteen different schools. 20 There are more than 300 
schools in Division I-A eligible to play in the NCAA 
tournament, but less than 5% of these schools dominate 
the Final Four. 
 From 1982 to 2005, 51% of all final four appearances 
in NCAA women’s basketball were made by just six 
schools.21 
 From 1947 to 2005, 50% of all appearances in the 
championship game of the NCAA college world  
series were made by just seven schools.22 
 From 1982 to 2005, 58.3% of all appearances in the 
championship games of NCAA women’s softball were 
made by just two schools.23 
 From 1970 to 2005, 61.1% of the appearances in the 
championship game in NCAA men’s volleyball were 
made by just three schools.24 
 From 1981 to 2005, 58.3% of all appearances in the 
championship games in NCAA women’s volleyball 
were made by just four schools.25 
 
College football has historically not had a championship.  However, in  
looking at the top eight slots in the final Associated Press poll, Peach reports 
                                                 
18. Jim Peach, College Athletics, Universities, and the NCAA, 44 SOC. SCI. J. 11, 14 (2007)  
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
19. See id. at 15–20. 
20. Id. at 17. 
21. Id. at 19. 
22. Id. at 17–18. 
23. Id. at 19–20. 
24. Id. at 18. 
25. Id. at 19–20. 
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that 51.6% of those slots from 1950 to 2005 were held by just twelve schools.26  
In sport after sport, Peach found that a small collection of schools  
dominated.  It was not the same schools in each sport, but in each sport, there 
are a collection of schools that appear to control the competition.  In sum,  
college sports do not have competitive balance. 
It appears the restriction on pay is the primary reason for the lack of  
balance.  The Duke Blue Devils won the 2015 NCAA Men's Basketball  
Championship with three players—Tyus Jones, Jahlil Okafor, and Justise  
Winslow—who were selected in the first twenty-four picks of the 2015 NBA 
draft.  The University of Kentucky reached the Final Four in 2015 with six  
players selected in the NBA draft—a list that included Karl-Anthony Towns 
(first pick), Willie Cauley-Stein (sixth pick), Trey Lyles (twelfth pick), and 
Devin Booker (thirteenth pick).  In contrast, of the 351 schools that played  
Division I-A basketball, 320 did not have a single player selected in the 2015 
NBA draft.   
Why do the top schools have so many drafted players? The key is whom 
they recruit.  Each year the top high school players are ranked by a variety of 
different experts.  The Recruiting Services Consensus Index27 summarizes these 
rankings to create a consensus listing of the top players each year.28 
As one can see, from 2009 to 2014, John Calipari, head coach at the  
University of Kentucky, was able to recruit twenty-seven of these players.  So 
far, only one of these players stayed at Kentucky long enough to graduate.  Of 
the remaining twenty-six, twenty were drafted by an NBA team, many after only 
playing one season at Kentucky.  
 
Table One: Top Ranked High School Players Recruited by John Calipari 




Rank Player Outcome (as of June, 2015) 
2009 2 John Wall Drafted 
2009 3 DeMarcus Cousins Drafted 
2009 16 Daniel Orton Drafted 
2009 55 Eric Bledsoe Drafted 
2009 58 Jon Hood Stayed in school for five years 
2010 5 Brandon Knight Drafted 
                                                 
26. Id. at 15–16. 
27. RSCIHOOPS, https://sites.google.com/site/rscihoops/home (last visited June 9, 2016). 
28. Basketball-Reference reports the RSCI rankings. See Recruiting Services Consensus Index 
(RSCI) Rankings - 2015, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE, http://www.basketball-reference.com/awards/re-
cruit_rankings_2015.html (last visited June 9, 2016). 
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2010 10 Terrence Jones Drafted 
2010 25 Doron Lamb Drafted 
2010 43 Stacey Poole Transferred 
2011 1 Anthony Davis Drafted 
2011 3 Michael Kidd-Gilchrist Drafted 
2011 7 Marquis Teague Drafted 
2011 18 Kyle Wiltjer Transferred 
2012 1 Nerlens Noel Drafted 
2012 8 Alex Poythress Still at Kentucky 
2012 12 Archie Goodwin Drafted 
2012 39 Willie Cauley-Stein Drafted 
2013 2 Julius Randle Draft  
2013 4 Andrew Harrison Drafted 
2013 6 Aaron Harrison Undrafted, signed to NBA team 
2013 9 Dakari Johnson Drafted 
2013 11 James Young Drafted 
2013 16 Marcus Lee Still at Kentucky 
2014 2 Karl-Anthony Towns Drafted  
2014 5 Devin Booker Drafted  
2014 9 Trey Lyles Drafted 
2014 18 Tyler Ulis  Still at Kentucky 
 
Why do all these players attend Kentucky?  Because schools cannot pay a 
player more than the cost of attendance, players need another criterion to  
select which school to attend.  It appears this choice is often motivated by the 
desire to win.  And how do you know which schools are likely to win? It appears 
players are looking at who won in the past.   
And that means the very rule designed to promote competitive balance (i.e., 
restricting pay) is having the opposite effect.  Restrictions on pay are actually 
promoting competitive imbalance as the very best talents join each other on the 
same small collection of teams. 
IV. THE EXPLOITATION STORY 
So if restricting pay does not promote competitive balance, what does this 
rule accomplish?  The answer is simple: exploitation. 
Are college athletes exploited?  Here is an answer the Author gave during 
the NLRB hearing regarding the Northwestern football union case: “There is an 
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economic definition of the word ‘exploitation[]’ . . . . A worker is  
exploited . . . if their economic value is greater than their wages. . . . By that 
definition, they are exploited.”29  The definition the Author quoted in the NLRB 
hearing comes originally from the work of economist Joan Robinson.  Looking 
at the data, it is clear that many college athletes are generating more revenue 
than they are being paid. 
Consider the basketball players employed by Duke University.  The men’s 
basketball team of Duke University won the 2015 NCAA Men’s Basketball 
Championship.  According to data from the Department of Education— 
submitted by Duke University—this team generated $33.7 million in revenue.30  
Of this, $6.04 million went to Mike Krzyzewski (the team's head coach).31  In 
other words, Duke paid 17.9% of team revenue to its coach. 
To put that in perspective, Gregg Popovich led the San Antonio Spurs to the 
NBA title in the 2013–2014 season.  That year he was reportedly paid $8  
million.32 Forbes, though, reported the Spurs had $170 million in revenue in the 
2014–2015 season.33  So Popovich—who coached the Spurs to five NBA titles 
in twenty years—is only paid 4.7% of team revenue.  If Krzyzewski was paid 
the same percentage of team revenue, his salary would only be $1,570.797.   
What explains the difference? The NBA’s collective bargaining agreement 
states the NBA players are to be paid approximately 50% of league revenue.  In 
contrast, Duke University cannot pay its basketball players more than the cost 
of attendance.  According to Duke University, this amount is $67,654.34  During 
the 2014–2015 season, twelve different players received minutes for Duke  
University.  If each player was paid the cost of attendance, then Duke  
University would have paid all of its players $811,848.  In other words, Duke 
would only have paid its players 2.4% of its revenue.  
                                                 
29. Economist: College Football Like NFL--But for No Pay, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/02/19/college-football-nfl-player-pay-student-ath-
letes-northwestern/5624651/. 
30. Duke University: Revenues and Expenses, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/in-
dex.aspx (follow “Get data for one institution” hyperlink; then search “Duke University” in “Name of 
Institution” field, then click the “Duke University” hyperlink, then follow the “Revenues and Expenses” 
hyperlink) (last visited June 9, 2016). 
31. Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Salaries: NCAAB Coaches, USA TODAY SPORTS, 
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/mens-basketball/coach/ (last visited June 9, 2016). 
32. Dan Feldman, Phil Jackson and the Knicks Are Changing the Coaching-Salary Game, NBC 
SPORTS (June 9, 2014), http://nba.nbcsports.com/2014/06/09/phil-jackson-and-the-knicks-are-chang-
ing-the-coaching-salary-game/. 
33. The Business of Basketball: San Antonio Spurs, FORBES (Jan. 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/teams/san-antonio-spurs/. 
34. Cost: 2015-2016 Estimated Cost of Attendance (Student Budget), DUKE FIN. AID, https://finan-
cialaid.duke.edu/undergraduate-applicants/cost (last visited June 9, 2016).  These numbers are for the 
2015–2016 academic year.  The numbers from the 2014–2015 academic year are likely a bit less.  
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If Duke was forced to pay its players 50% of its revenue—as required in the 
NBA—then the average pay of each player would be $1.4 million.  And if a 
different allocation besides a perfectly equitable split was chosen, some players 
would be worth substantially more. 
For example, Duke could pay its players based on time spent on the court.  
If Duke took this approach, a player like Quinn Cook would be worth nearly $3 
million.35  In other words, Cook would be paid nearly forty-four times the 
amount Duke is currently paying him.   
 
Table Two: The Economic Value of the 2014–2015 Duke University Men’s 
Basketball Players: Value According to Minutes Played 
Player Minutes Played  Estimated Economic Value of Player 
Quinn Cook 1395 $2,974,961 
Tyus Jones 1322 $2,817,891 
Jahlil Okafor 1143 $2,432,747 
Justise Winslow 1135 $2,415,534 
Matt Jones 847 $1,795,862 
Amile Jefferson 831 $1,761,435 
Rasheed Sulaimon 386 $803,956 
Marshall Plumlee 375 $780,288 
Grayson Allen 322 $666,251 
Nick Pagliuca 17 $145,716 
Semi Ojeleye 64 $145,716 
Sean Kelly 11 $145,716 
TOTALS 7,848 $16,886,073 
 
Of course, players are not generally just paid for their time.  Players in sports 
tend to be paid according to productivity.  Following the methodology of the 
Author,36 the number of wins each player produced on Duke’s 2014–2015 team 
                                                 
35. As noted, the NBA model results in 50% of revenue going to players. The NBA also imposes a 
league minimum.  The league minimum is about 10.4% of league average salary.  Larry Coon, Table 
of Contents: What Are the Players’ Salary Restrictions?, NBA SALARY CAP FAQ, 
http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q16 (last updated July 8, 2015).  Following this approach, Nick 
Pagliuca, Semi Ojeleye, and Sean Kelly—whose minutes were quite limited—were given the estimated 
minimum salary.  To ensure player values do not exceed 50% of team revenue, the remaining players 
saw their estimated value reduced by an amount that would keep the sum of all player values at 50% of 
Duke revenue.  
36. David J. Berri, A Simple Model of Worker Productivity in the National Basketball Association, 
in 3 THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 18–22 (Brad R. Humphreys & Dennis R. Howard eds., 2008). This 
methodology was later updated.  See DAVID J. BERRI & MARTIN B. SCHMIDT, STUMBLING ON WINS: 
TWO ECONOMISTS EXPOSE THE PITFALLS ON THE ROAD TO VICTORY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS  
148–54 (Kirk Jensen et al. eds., 2010); see also How to Calculate Wins Produced, WAGES WINS J., 
http://wagesofwins.com/how-to-calculate-wins-produced/ (last visited June 9, 2016). 
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was estimated.  The results indicate that Jahlil Okafor was worth nearly eight 
wins to this team or 25.1% of the team’s total wins.  If Okafor was paid 25.1% 
of the revenue designated to the players (i.e., 50% of team revenue), then 
Okafor’s value would be $4.13 million.  And that means Okafor would be paid 
approximately sixty-one times the cost of attendance. 
 
Table Three: The Economic Value of the 2014–2015 Duke  
University Men’s Basketball Players: Value According to Wins  
Produced 
Player Wins Produced Estimated Economic Value of Player 
Jahlil Okafor 7.97 $4,130,034 
Justise Winslow 6.64 $3,424,432 
Tyus Jones 5.83 $2,992,423 
Amile Jefferson 5.12 $2,613,257 
Quinn Cook 3.34 $1,668,938 
Marshall Plumlee 1.91 $910,642 
Grayson Allen 0.87 $357,736 
Rasheed Sulaimon 0.58 $205,745 
Nick Pagliuca 0.06 $145,716 
Semi Ojeleye 0.01 $145,716 
Sean Kelly -0.04 $145,716 
Matt Jones -0.51 $145,716 
TOTALS 31.78 $16,886,071 
 
Remember, if Coach Krzyzewski was paid according to the NBA model, 
his pay would decline from over $6 million to about $1.57 million.  If Okafor 
was paid according to the NBA model for his production of wins, he would 
make 2.6 times as much as his coach. 
Such a result appears to be consistent with the NBA model.  The San  
Antonio Spurs paid Tony Parker, Tim Duncan, and Tiago Splitter more than 
Gregg Popovich for the 2013–2014 season.37  That same season, the Miami Heat 
reportedly paid Eric Spoelstra $3 million38 while paying both Chris Bosh and 
LeBron James $19.1 million.39 
Such a pattern actually makes sense.40  LeBron James reached the NBA 
                                                 
37. 2013-14 San Antonio Spurs Roster and Stats, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE, http://www.basket-
ball-reference.com/teams/SAS/2014.html (last visited June 9, 2016). 
38. Berkowitz et al., supra note 31. 
39. 2013-14 Miami Heat Roster and Stats, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE, http://www.basketball-refer-
ence.com/teams/MIA/2014.html (last visited June 9, 2016). 
40. Published research has shown that most NBA coaches do not alter player performance. See 
generally David J. Berri et al., The Role of Managers in Team Performance, 4 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 75 
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Finals six times with three different head coaches. One suspects a big reason 
why these teams found success was the play of LeBron.  In fact, LeBron made 
this somewhat clear when he overruled his latest head coach David Blatt and 
then proceeded to hit a game winning shot in the 2015 NBA playoffs.41 
Given what viewers see in the NBA, it is not surprising to see evidence that 
top players in college are so valuable.  But it is important to emphasize that this 
pattern does not just apply to the top players.   
Consider the case of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.  According 
to the Department of Education, this program earned $2.1 million in revenue in 
the 2014–2015 academic year.  If 50% went to the players, then the thirteen 
players who saw minutes would receive an average salary of $82,971.   
Because the cost of attendance is $33,738,42 this means the average player on 
this team is worth more than twice the money the school gives him. 
Turning to the players’ production of wins, we also see evidence that one 
player is worth more than the coach.  Rob Jeter, the team’s head coach, was paid 
about $450,000 in 2014, or more than 20% of the team’s revenue.43  
Looking at the player’s productivity, though, Matt Tiby produced 6.5 wins on a 
team that won fourteen games.  That means Tiby is worth nearly $500,000. 
As seen with Duke, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee players are 
also, on average, generating more revenue than they are being paid to attend the 
school.  In addition, the top player on this team is worth more than the coach.  
In sum, whether looking at big or small schools, it is evident that players are 
exploited by the current system in college sports.  
What is to make of the athletes who are not generating substantial  
revenue?  Colleges have actually insisted for over a century that athletics are a 
legitimate part of a student’s education.  So just as society does not expect  
students in other disciplines to generate revenue to justify their education, it also 
does not make sense to expect athletes in non-revenue-generating sports to do 
the same.  To do so would suggest that colleges have not been entirely honest 
about why athletics are part of college education in the first place.  
                                                 
(2009). 
41. Dan Gartland, LeBron James Overruled David Blatt’s Play Call Before Hitting Buzzer Beater, 
SI, http://www.si.com/nba/2015/05/10/lebron-james-david-blatt-play-call-final-shot (last updated May 
11, 2015). 
42. College Profile: University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, COLLEGEDATA, http://www.col-
legedata.com/cs/data/college/college_pg03_tmpl.jhtml?schoolId=1702 (last visited June 9, 2016). 
43. Lori Nickel, ‘Stick to the Plan’: UWM Coach Rob Jeter Never Wavered, MILWAUKEE J. 
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V.  A FREE MARKET FOR COLLEGE SPORTS LABOR 
So it seems clear that college athletes are frequently exploited by the 
NCAA.  It also seems clear that the obvious solution is for the NCAA to abide 
by the same rules we see in labor markets in non-sports industries.   
Specifically, it is illegal—outside of sports—for firms to collude to limit the 
compensation of employees. 
A free market for labor in college sports would likely limit the ability of 
teams like the University of Kentucky to dominate college basketball.  As  
noted, the 2014 edition of this team had six different players drafted by the 
NBA. Four other players were ranked in the top twenty of their respective high 
school recruiting class.   
Kentucky’s roster during the 2014–2015 season had ten highly ranked  
basketball prospects, which meant at any given time, five players sat on the 
bench at Kentucky who would likely have started for most of the other 350  
Division I-A teams.  
Kentucky was able to stockpile this talent because the compensation of all 
college athletes is capped. But what if that was not the case?  If teams faced a 
free market for labor, then the wages of these athletes would likely be increased 
to a point where wages approximated economic value.  And as we noted, that 
economic value—if colleges followed the NBA model—often exceeds $1  
million for the stars.  It is unlikely Kentucky would give $1 million to an athlete 
who does not play full-time.  And that means some of these players who  
attended Kentucky during the 2014–2015 season would have gone elsewhere in 
a free market. 
Those who remained, though, would be paid more.  Where would this 
money come from? One obvious source is the salaries paid to the head coach.  
Again, John Calipari’s wage rivals what we see in the NBA. But revenues for 
Calipari’s program do not justify such a wage.  This wage is only possible  
because players are not paid according to the free market. 
The decrease in coaches’ salaries would not be the only impact of a free 
market for college athletes.  Essentially anyone currently benefitting from the 
present labor market might see his or her benefits reduced.  And if the courts 
ever agreed that collusion in college sports is indeed illegal, that would likely 
be the outcome. 
There is, though, a legal way for colleges and universities to limit pay even 
if the current arrangement was ruled illegal.  Professional sports leagues have a 
number of institutions that would clearly be illegal in non-sports  
settings.  These institutions include reverse-order drafts, restricted free agency, 
and salary caps.  Outside of sports, a firm could not collude to determine where 
a worker works and how much he is allowed to be paid, but these institutions 
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are legal in sports because the existence of these institutions results from  
collective bargaining with unions. 
The NCAA has resisted a players’ union because it believes its current  
arrangement will not be changed.  If that turns out not to be true, though, the 
NCAA will definitely want players to unionize. That means the NCAA—
contrary to its position in the Northwestern football union case—should be in 
favor of college athletes forming a union.   
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
College athletics have been commercial for over a century.  And for over a 
century, colleges and universities have refused to share the bulk of the revenue 
sports generate with the athletes who make this possible. 
The NCAA’s argument that this is necessary to promote competitive  
balance is simply not consistent with the empirical evidence.  What the evidence  
indicates is that these rules have resulted in the economic exploitation of many 
college athletes. 
Thus far the NCAA has been able to successfully defend this system from 
multiple legal challenges.  If one of these challenges succeeds, though, the 
NCAA will be faced with the same labor market seen outside the world of 
sports.  And just as firms thrive in this labor market in the rest of the economy, 
we can expect the NCAA to continue to thrive as well.  The only difference will 
be that the players will get more, while those who benefit and promote the  
current system will get less.  
 
